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taking a 
new look at 
Mainecare
by Paul saucier
sponsored, in part, by the Maine Health Access Foundation, an organization committed to promoting affordable 
and timely access to comprehensive, quality health care, and to improving the health of every Maine resident.
taKinG a new looK at MainecaRe
Maine’s Medicaid program, called MaineCare, provides 
health care coverage to one in five state residents. Paul 
Saucier gives an overview of  MaineCare’s services, eligi-
bility categories, and financing. He discusses root causes 
of  MaineCare’s continued expansion in breadth and cost, 
which has prompted reform proposals to rein in what many 
believe is unsustainable growth. Examining reform efforts 
in other states, Saucier cautions that we need to learn 
from these experiments. Finally, he raises important ques-
tions for policymakers related to MaineCare’s mission, its 
complexity, and the stability of  its financing. Two commen-
taries provide additional viewpoints on these questions. 
Lisa Pohlmann and Christine Hastedt critique reform 
efforts in several states and emphasize the key role of 
MaineCare in the state’s overall health care system. 
Dr. Erik Steele discusses MaineCare from the providers’ 
perspective. He suggests that delays and problems in the 
state’s reimbursement to providers have led to doubts about 
the state’s credibility both as a payer and as a health care 
systems change leader.    
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Maine’s Medicaid program, called Mainecare, is an important part of  the state’s health care system. 
it provides health care coverage to one out of  every 
fi ve Maine citizens. the largest group covered is poor 
children and their parents, though nearly two-thirds 
of  the program’s costs are attributed to the smaller 
group of  people receiving long-term care and disability 
support services. Many Mainecare members would be 
uninsured or underinsured if  Mainecare did not exist 
because they are unemployed, work for an employer 
that does not offer insurance, or have long-term care 
or disability support needs that neither employer-
sponsored insurance nor Medicare cover. 
in 005, Medicaid provided health care coverage 
to 37.8 million people nationally, surpassing Medicare, 
which covered 34.6 million (Kaiser family foundation 
007). adjusted for infl ation, national (state and 
federal combined) Medicaid expenditures grew from 
$40.9 billion in 1985 to $311 billion in 005 (U.S. 
department of  Health and Human Services 007). the 
growth in Medicaid spending is caused in part by the 
same infl ationary pressures affecting health care costs 
generally, but also refl ects steady, intentional, incre-
mental expansion of  eligibility, much of  which has 
been mandated federally and some of  which has been 
optional to states. over time (and particularly since the 
late1980s), Medicaid has been the program of  choice 
for incremental expansion of  publicly fi nanced health 
coverage, as employer-based insurance has waned and 
attempts at comprehensive universal coverage have 
failed repeatedly (Brown and Sparer 003).
Maine has been no exception to the national 
trend, responding to federal mandates and incentives 
to expand coverage. as a result, the state’s share of  
Mainecare costs has consumed an increasing portion 
of  the state’s General fund, from 1.4 percent in 
Sfy 1997, to .8 percent in Sfy 006 (offi ce of  
fiscal and Program Review 007a). with Mainecare 
now second only to General Purpose aid for local 
Schools in state expenditures, the program has 
become central to state budget deliberations and is 
subject to increasing policy scrutiny as its growth 
threatens to crowd out other state priorities. is 
Mainecare a safety net program for certain categories 
of  poor people, or is it a key component of  a larger 
universal coverage strategy? 
what are the federal require-
ments for state participation, 
and does the program really 
need to be so complex? is it 
possible to increase the fi scal 
stability of  the program? 
How can the program’s value 
be maximized for benefi ciaries 
and tax payers? But before 
we delve into these questions, 
an overview of  the Medicaid 
program’s basic features is 
in order.
MEDICAID BASICS
Mainecare, like all Medicaid programs across the country, operates as a partnership between the 
state and federal governments. State participation is 
voluntary, but since 198 every state has chosen to 
participate. States must adhere to federal regulations, 
but have some fl exibility regarding eligibility, benefi ts, 
and payments to providers. State fl exibility in adminis-
tering programs means no two Medicaid programs are 
exactly alike.
the federal legislation creating Medicaid was 
enacted in 1965, largely as an afterthought to 
Medicare, which was the real focus of  the debate at the 
time (friedman 1995). it was a compromise, considered 
not very signifi cant, that would provide basic health 
care to certain categories of  people: poor children and 
their caretaker relatives receiving aid to families with 
dependent children (afdc), and persons who were 
blind, elderly, or disabled. Unlike the universal nature 
of  Medicare for older people, Medicaid was created 
as a means-tested, categorical program with a two-part 
eligibility requirement. first, a person needed to be 
in one of  the population categories described above 
(afdc, blind, elderly, disabled), and second, the person 
needed to be poor. in 1996, federal welfare reform 
replaced afdc with temporary assistance for needy 
families (tanf), and severed the formal link between 
welfare and Medicaid, but the program fundamentally 
remained categorical and means-tested.
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Financing Mostly Federal
the federal government provides matching 
funds as an incentive for states to provide coverage. 
the matching formula for services takes into account 
the relative income across states and sets a minimum 
matching rate of  50 percent. Because Maine’s median 
income is below the national average, the federal 
government provides a relatively high matching rate for 
Mainecare services, not quite 63 percent in Sfy 006. 
this means that for every $100 of  services purchased 
by Mainecare, the federal government paid about $63 
and the state paid about $37. the federal government 
pays a flat 50 percent matching rate to all states for 
administrative costs. in Sfy 006, Mainecare benefit 
costs were around $. billion. of  this, the state paid 
approximately $800 million, and the federal govern-
ment about $1.4 billion (office of  fiscal and Program 
Review 007a). the federal matching incentive has had 
the intended effect, prompting states to add services 
and population groups to the Medicaid program over 
time, especially services that were previously funded 
with 100 percent state dollars that could be “refi-
nanced” to attract federal dollars. Services to persons 
with mental retardation, for example, were previously 
a state responsibility exclusively, but now most mental 
retardation services are financed by Medicaid.
Complex Eligibility Categories
in order to qualify, a person must have low 
income, expressed as a percentage of  the federal 
poverty level (fPl) and must fall into one of  several 
categories defined by the federal government. the basic 
federal categorical groups include older persons 
(65 and over), persons who meet Social Security 
disability criteria, children, parents with minor 
children living at home, and pregnant women. 
States have some flexibility to extend income eligi-
bility above federally required floors, and the floor 
and ceiling levels vary by categorical group. table 
1 displays Mainecare income eligibility levels for 
basic categories of  people, compared to the other 
new england states.
the complexity introduced by this approach to 
eligibility is obvious, even at this summary level, where 
only major categories are displayed. Maine and other 
states actually have dozens of  eligibility categories, 
developed over many years in response to incremental 
federal policy changes focused on expanding eligibility. 
in addition to the eligibility choices that states may elect 
under explicit federal policy, they may propose to cover 
additional categories of  people, or cover existing groups 
at higher income levels, by seeking federal approval of  
waivers to “normal” federal rules. for example, Maine, 
Massachusetts, vermont, and several states outside new 
england have received waivers to extend coverage to 
low-income individuals who do not fit existing federal 
categories. these individuals are referred to variously as 
“non-categoricals” or “childless adults.” 
Mandatory, Optional and Waiver Services
the benefits provided by Mainecare are also 
guided by federal requirements and options. States 
must provide certain services (called “mandatory”), and 
have the option to provide several additional benefits 
(called “optional”) by including them in their state 
Medicaid Plans. Maine and every other state cover 
several optional services to maximize federal matching 
funds and to stay current with evolving health care 
delivery trends. Since the program was first authorized 
in 1965, the provision of  health services has shifted 
from institutional settings to outpatient settings, and to 
take advantage of  these changes, the federal govern-
ment has authorized new benefits in the optional 
category. Many optional services, such as prescription 
drugs and home health services, are central to health 
treatment today. in addition to mandatory and optional 
services, states may seek waivers to offer certain benefits 
associated primarily with community-based long-term 
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TABLe 1:  New england income eligibility levels  
 for Major Medicaid Categorical Groups, 2006,  
 by Percentage of Federal Poverty level
 Pregnant   Children Parents elderly,  
states Women infants 1-19 (non-working) disabled
Connecticut 185% 185% 185% 150% 69%
Maine 200% 200% 150% 200% 100%
Massachusetts 200% 200% 150% 133% 100%
new hampshire 185% 300% 185% 45% 76%
rhode island 250% 250% 250% 185% 100%
vermont 200% 300% 300% 185% 74%
 
source: Kaiser family foundation (2007)
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care and disability support services. Mainecare operates 
community-based services waiver programs for older 
persons, persons with mental retardation, persons with 
Hiv-aidS, and others. 
two traditional requirements of  “regular” (non-
waiver) services are that they be offered statewide, 
and be comparable across categorical groups. this has 
made it diffi cult for state Medicaid programs to target 
specifi c services to subsets of  benefi ciaries, because a 
service available to one person must be available to all. 
States may use pre-authorization processes to ensure 
that services go to those who need them, but doing so 
carries an additional administrative cost.
Service Delivery Options
Mainecare generally relies on the traditional, 
existing network of  doctors, hospitals, home health 
agencies, rural health centers, and others. despite 
paying less than commercial insurers for many services, 
the Mainecare program enjoys high rates of  participa-
tion among most types of  providers. in addition to 
traditional healthcare providers, Mainecare also funds 
a large array of  long-term care and disability support 
service providers, refl ecting the program’s role as the 
largest funder of  disability and long-term care services. 
these are services that are generally not covered by 
commercial health plans or Medicare, such as long-
term nursing home stays, home care services, and 
personal assistance services.
when created in 1965, Medicaid was modeled 
after the predominant fee-for-service delivery system 
of  the time. as employer-based coverage has moved 
to various forms of  managed care, so have many state 
Medicaid programs, particularly those with urban 
centers where commercial HMos thrive. Maine’s 
managed care market has not been nearly as robust as 
those in larger states, and Mainecare remains predomi-
nantly a traditional fee-for-service program. 
disease management, also pioneered by managed 
care organizations, appears to be ushering in a new 
wave of  care management efforts in which a state 
Medicaid program layers care management on top 
of  the existing fee-for-service system. the disease 
management/care management approach is typically 
targeted to groups of  benefi ciaries based on condition 
(e.g., diabetes, asthma) or by cost of  care (so-called 
high users). Mainecare is pursuing a care management 
strategy, premised on the hypothesis that better primary 
care, patient education, and other low-intervention 
strategies decrease unnecessary use of  emergency 
rooms, hospitals, and other high-cost services, thereby 
improving care while saving money. Because care 
management for Medicaid benefi ciaries has just begun 
in Maine, there is as yet no substantive data about its
impact on costs or quality of  care.  
THE NATIONAL MEDICAID DEBATE
the national debate about Medicaid can be boiled down to two major issues: fi scal sustainability and 
the degree of  fl exibility states should have to design 
and manage their individual programs (Pew center on 
the States 006). nationally, Medicaid is expected to 
spend $350 billion in 007, and the congressional 
Budget offi ce has estimated growth of  7.7 percent a 
year over the next decade (U.S. department of  Health 
and Human Services 006). concerns about Medicaid 
sustainability have increased as Medicaid costs consume 
an increasing portion of  federal and state budgets, and 
health care costs overall increase as a percent of  gross 
national and state products. this concern has been 
exacerbated as Medicaid has expanded to address the 
growing problem of  uninsured americans (and particu-
larly children) in response to the steady erosion of  
employer-based coverage. 
Kronick and Rousseau (007) argue that the 
Medicaid sustainability question is overblown. their 
future expenditure model estimates that Medicaid will 
stay roughly unchanged as a percentage of  national 
health expenditures (16.6 percent) until 05, then rise 
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to 19 percent through 045. the model considers the 
long-term care needs of  aging baby boomers and proj-
ects forward the downward trend in employer-based 
coverage. it does not assume any further expansion of  
Medicaid eligibility. Kronick’s and Rousseau’s analysis 
offers some comfort that Medicaid, in its current form, 
will not bankrupt the federal government.
long-term projections aside, state policymakers 
face the need to balance their budgets on an annual 
or biennial basis, and with Medicaid growth gener-
ally outpacing the growth of  state general revenues, 
the program is viewed by some as crowding out other 
public priorities. the issue is not only fiscal sustain-
ability, but political sustainability as well. 
the national flexibility debate is linked to the 
sustainability issue. Governors have lent bipartisan 
support to greater state flexibility, arguing that they must 
have more discretion if  they are to effectively manage 
a program that consumes an increasing portion of  their 
budgets, and if  they are to reposition the program as 
a key component of  the larger health care system. But 
calls for flexibility are rejoined by some national advo-
cacy groups, where there is concern that state flexibility 
is little more than a euphemism for cutting services. 
HOW FAR CAN A STATE GO?
as described earlier, states have some flexibility within existing federal regulations to establish 
eligibility, benefits and provider payment rates. Until 
recently, that flexibility was largely limited to exercising 
explicit state options contained in federal law. Provisions 
contained in the deficit Reduction act of  005 (dRa), 
however, gave states substantial new flexibility. Under 
dRa, states can replace or supplement traditional 
Medicaid services with one of  several “benchmark” 
plans, which can be modeled after the Blue cross Blue 
Shield plan offered to federal employees, the health 
plan offered to state employees, the coverage offered by 
the largest HMo in the state, or other coverage deter-
mined appropriate by the federal Secretary of  Health 
and Human Services. furthermore, a state can offer 
different benefit packages across beneficiary categories 
or geographical areas without seeking waivers of  the 
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TABLe 2:  state Plan Amendments Approved under the Deficit reduction Act (DrA), as of June 2007
state initiative
 
idaho value based reform 
 
 










south Carolina state 
employee high deductible 
health Plan, and health 
opportunity account 
 




Creates three voluntary benchmark plans: Basic for children and adults; 
enhanced for persons with disabilities and special health needs; and Coordinated 
for beneficiaries with Medicare (“duals”). 
 
Creates a voluntary benchmark plan for working disabled, to allow use  
of personal care services in the workplace. 
 
Creates four benchmark plans:  Family Choices, modeled after the state employee
 plan, is mandatory for children;  Comprehensive Choices is voluntary for elderly
 with long-term care needs;   and Optimum Choices is voluntary for persons
 with mental retardation. the fourth plan, Global Choices, is the default plan for
 those who are not in one of the others. Kentucky is also using the
 
dra to
 offer premium assistance for those who have and elect a private coverage
 option.  
 
up to 1,000 beneficiaries in richland County will be eligible to opt into  
the state employee high deductible plan.  availability of a self-managed health 
opportunity account will partially offset the value of the deductible. 
 
 
voluntary benchmark plan to offer additional disease management benefits  
for persons with one of four conditions. 
 
two benchmark plans, Basic and enhanced, with enhanced enrollment contingent 





















June 2007  
 
May 2006
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traditional requirements of  comparability and statewide 
coverage. dRa flexibility can be gained by amending 
the State Medicaid Plan, a process that requires formal 
review by the federal government, but is much less 
cumbersome than seeking waivers of  existing law. 
as of  June 007, the federal centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (cMS) had approved dRa State 
Plan amendments in seven states. consistent with the 
intent of  the dRa, the amendments approved to date 
show tremendous variety and experimentation across 
states (table ). variety aside, every state has used the 
benchmarking provision to alter services in one way 
or another, and with the exception of  South carolina 
(which has used a state employee plan as the bench-
mark), every other amendment so far has opted for a 
unique benchmark approved by the secretary of  the 
federal dHHS. of  particular relevance to Maine are 
the dRa initiatives in virginia and washington, where 
a benchmark plan will supplement “regular” Medicaid 
with a disease management initiative.
States seeking more comprehensive reform than 
that available under the dRa can pursue a Section 
1115 waiver. this mechanism can be used to waive 
most provisions of  federal Medicaid law, but the overall 
proposal must cost the federal government no more 
than it would have cost under the regular program. 
Section 1115 waivers are notoriously difficult to obtain 
from the federal government. there are no set time 
frames on the approval process, and they can take 
years to negotiate. an additional disadvantage is that 
the federal government insists on hard caps to ensure 
cost neutrality, which means the federal share of  cost 
is capped, whether or not actual expenses come in as 
projected. However, if  a state wants to expand eligi-
bility or reform its Medicaid program in some other 
way that exceeds the flexibility allowed in the dRa, 
the waiver process may be unavoidable.  
vermont and florida are getting much attention 
because their Section 1115 waiver reform programs 
are far-reaching and currently being implemented 
(table 3). But the two efforts are very different philo-
sophically and conceptually, underscoring the degree 
of  flexibility available to states and reflecting the 
market realities of  each state. florida, with a large 
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TABLe 3:  Comprehensive reform in Florida and Vermont:   
 Two Different Applications of state Flexibility under section 1115 Medicaid Waivers
state initiative
Florida’s Medicaid  
reform Waiver 
 
approved fall 2005 
 
Pilot implementation  












approved and took  
effect fall 2005
Major Program features
shifts program from defined benefit to 
defined contribution. 
 
state sets aside a per person, risk-
adjusted contribution that consumers 
use to buy a plan from the market, and 
looks to the market to create choice  
 
state accepts a per capita cap from the 
federal government and allows plans to 
define benefits and control use within 
available state contribution. 
 
state accepts a global cap on federal 
contributions and assumes direct 
responsibility for managing within the 
cap by establishing itself as a managed 
care organization. 
 
state may define benefits, increase  
cost sharing and cap enrollment and 
may apply savings to non-Medicaid 
health services. 
risk dynamics
the state accepts risk from the federal government  
for expenses that exceed the per person cap. 
 
the state passes its risk to health plans in the form of 
defined contributions, and the plans must manage within 
those amounts.  
 
health plans manage their costs by defining benefits  
and managing use.  
 
beneficiaries are no longer guaranteed a standard benefit 
package and are responsible for choosing a plan that  
meets their needs. 
 
the state accepts risk from the federal government  
for any expenses that exceed the global cap.  
 
the state manages the risk itself and has flexibility to  
define benefits, cap enrollment and use other strategies  
to contain costs. 
 
beneficiaries are no longer guaranteed a standard  
benefit package, and in the state’s policy debates, they  
may compete with other health initiatives for which 
vermont may now use its federal funding.
and value. 
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population and robust competition among dozens 
of  health plans, seeks to use Medicaid’s purchasing 
power to make an array of  health plan choices avail-
able to beneficiaries and, in a substantial departure 
from traditional Medicaid, make the beneficiaries 
themselves responsible for making choices that meet 
their needs. vermont, where the population density 
and health care market more closely resemble that 
of  Maine, has established its Medicaid agency as a 
managed care organization, taking on directly the 
risks and potential rewards of  managing beneficiary 
care within a capped global budget. 
the state efforts described in tables  and 3 
clearly demonstrate that states have a substantial 
amount of  flexibility to reform their programs, and 
they are doing so in ways that respond to their unique 
political, social and market conditions. Maine can do 
the same, but before we rush to emulate another state’s 
efforts, we need to step back, carefully reconsider the 
program in light of  its evolution, and set a new vision 
for its future.
TAKING A NEW LOOK AT MAINECARE
after more than 40 years of  incremental evolution, it’s time to take a fresh look at Mainecare and 
really consider the overall role it plays in our state. Key 
questions include the following.
What is MaineCare’s mission? Is it a  
fundamental part of a universal health care 
strategy, or a safety net program for  
certain categories of poor people? 
now covering 0 percent of  Maine’s population, 
Mainecare has become de facto a major part of  the 
state’s strategy to achieve health care coverage for all 
citizens, but one would be hard-pressed to find that 
role in Maine’s authorizing law: “the department [of  
Health and Human Services] is authorized to admin-
ister programs of  aid, medical or remedial care and 
services for medically indigent persons” (Maine Revised 
Statutes title , Section 3173). Provisions have been 
added over the years, adding incrementally to eligi-
bility, services, and cost sharing, with no overarching 
guidance that sets out a clear mission for the program. 
the recent Blue Ribbon commission on the future of  
Mainecare found that “due to the lack of  policy direc-
tion and in the absence of  program goals and manage-
ment focused on those goals, Mainecare has fallen into 
a pattern of  policy-making that is driven by fluctua-
tions in the state budget” (office of  Policy and legal 
analysis 006: 4). 
a contentious but key aspect of  this question is 
whether, in an environment of  few new resources, 
the program should be further expanded to reach 
more uninsured Mainers, perhaps with the tradeoff  of  
offering less comprehensive benefits. 
How can the program be simplified to more  
rationally advance its mission and enjoy  
broader social and political support?
Mainecare (and Medicaid generally) is a phenom-
enally complex program. dozens of  eligibility catego-
ries; mandatory, optional and waiver services that vary 
by population group; and vague, overarching standards 
(such as the “amount, duration and scope” standard of  
sufficiency) are only a few examples of  the character-
istics that make Medicaid a very difficult program to 
understand and administer. Because it takes so much 
effort just to come to a common understanding of  the 
facts, policy debate is arduous and often marked by 
disagreements about what is or is not true, rather than 
what is or is not good policy. and the fact that some 
people qualify for the program while others with the 
same financial profile do not (because they do not fit 
into a qualifying category) undermines support for the 
program among a public that sees serious inequities.
the complex structure of  the program is in large 
part a legacy of  its incremental growth over 40 years. 
any reform effort should seek to collapse eligibility 
criteria into only a very few, with the first being 
financial. if  Mainecare is to be the health coverage 
program for people at the low end of  the income 
scale who do not otherwise have access to coverage, it 
should strive to capture everyone in that category. to 
address charges that the benefit package is far more 
generous than those covered by commercial insurance, 
Maine could conduct a careful, side-by-side analysis 
comparing Mainecare to one or more benchmark 
packages, such as those enjoyed by state or university 
taKinG a new looK at MainecaRe
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system employees. Because the program is so impor-
tant to people with long-term care or disability needs, 
a second criterion would need to be an assessment of  
functional need, which would qualify those persons for 
an additional tier of  benefi ts related to disability.  
How can program fi nancing be stabilized?
as Mainecare lurches from one state budget 
to another, the options for cost containment in the 
traditional program are limited. Policymakers can 
reduce the number of  eligible people, reduce benefi ts, 
or reduce rates, none of  which are attractive from 
a policy or politics perspective. one approach that 
could raise additional revenue while also promoting 
greater equity would be to implement a premium 
structure not unlike that designed for the dirigo 
Health Plan, in which people between 100 percent 
and 300 percent of  the fPl would contribute to 
the cost of  their coverage, but on a graduated basis. 
Policymakers could establish global budget targets for 
the program with growth rates tied to an agreed-upon 
benchmark, and the sliding scale could be adjusted 
as needed to address anticipated shortfalls. this 
approach would undoubtedly cause some benefi ciaries 
to drop coverage, as occurred in the oregon Health 
Plan when premiums were increased. can we accept 
that as an expression of  consumer choice in the 
interest of  being able to offer the choice to greater 
numbers of  people?
another strategy that would yield much greater 
fi nancial benefi t to the state but is far more diffi cult 
to achieve is to work with other states to get a new 
deal with the federal government. federalizing all care 
for dually eligible benefi ciaries (those who have both 
Medicare and Medicaid) would save states an estimated 
$47.7 billion per year and would have the added 
benefi t of  rationalizing a system of  fi nancing and 
services that has historically been fragmented and inef-
fi cient (Holahan and weil 007). 
How can we maximize value 
for benefi ciaries and taxpayers? 
the old paradigm of  Mainecare as a bill payer 
with limited involvement in the health care system 
fails to recognize and leverage the program’s huge 
potential as a force for better health management. the 
State Health Plan notes that Maine has high rates of  
several chronic conditions, which, because of  their 
complexity, require management across providers, 
settings and time (Governor’s offi ce of  Health Policy 
and finance 006). Benefi ciaries with chronic condi-
tions present opportunities for higher quality care at 
a lower cost, if  closer management of  the conditions 
leads to lower rates of  emergency room, nursing home 
and hospital use. 
the Mainecare program is moving in this direc-
tion. it is expanding an initiative with a national 
care management organization that targets high-cost, 
chronically ill benefi ciaries, and it is preparing to select 
an administrative services organization to oversee the 
management of  Mainecare-funded behavioral health 
services. these efforts and others like them should be 
carefully monitored for effi cacy and expanded if  they 
are found to add value.
A PROGRAM WORTH DEBATING
Medicaid has come a long way from its roots as a relatively small program created as an after-
thought to Medicare. in terms of  size and the needs of  
the people it covers, it is arguably the most important 
health care program in the country. yet we continue 
to treat it as a marginal program, expanding it incre-
mentally when possible, and retracting it incrementally 
when budgets demand. the current interest in health 
care reform at both the state and federal levels gives 
us an opportunity to acknowledge Medicaid’s role and 
think seriously about how best to ensure the program’s 
long-term contributions to a more rational and effective 
health care system.   
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